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Abstract 
Outcomes of  the shallow lake interest conflict are presented in a number of different contexts: 
quasi-static and dynamic social planning, and quasi-static one-shot and repeated non-cooperative 
play. As the underlying dynamics are non-convex, the analysis uses geometrical-numerical 
methods: the possible kinds of solutions are efficiently classified in bifurcation diagrams.  1. Introduction 
In 2003, Mäler, Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw analysed the economics of the pollution of 
shallow lakes
1,2,3,4. They did this in two contexts: the first is optimal management problem, 
where a single social planner has to weigh the benefits of agricultural activities, which 
indirectly pollute the lake, against the costs arising from decreasing ecosystem services of the 
lake. In the second context, several social planners - communities, countries - share access to 
a lake, and they play some kind of pollution game against each other. They moreover 
investigated how the outcome of the game can be improved by setting an appropriate tax 
scheme. 
  Very quickly, it became apparent that the shallow lake problem class has a rich 
structure. Usually in economic analysis situations are considered where the dynamics of the 
stock variable is assumed to be a convex function of the state of the system, and a linear 
function of the action of the agents. In that case, if the agent chooses a time-constant action, 
there is a unique steady-state value to which the stock can converge.  
  It has been recognised already long ago that in many ecological systems the situation 
is different, as there may exist tipping points
5; these are critical values for the action, at which 
the ecosystem changes, or 'flips', in a way that is not instantly reversible. The system is said 
to undergo a catastrophic shift. Such shifts have been detected and documented in a great 
variety of systems
6; the flipping mechanism of shallow lakes is detailed below
7. One of the 
consequences of the existence of flipping points is that for a given action, there may be 
multiple steady state values of the stock, with radically different characteristics. 
  Whenever human activity influences the state of an ecosystem, usually through some 
form of pollution that is a by-product of some kind of production activity, the difficult 
problem arises of assessing the relative interests of producers affecting the ecosystem and 
producers and consumers enjoying it. To obtain a benchmark, which should be seen as the 
best possible scenario, the existence of a benevolent and omniscient social planner is 
postulated that tries to maximise society's welfare, taking into account the interests of both 
groups. This, of course, would be an entirely classical economic problem, if the dynamics of 
the pollution stock would be convex. It being non-convex changes matters considerably.  
  Standard economic problems usually feature a single equilibrium, and most of the 
results are about the degree of change of that equilibrium if certain parameters are varied. In 
a problem featuring multiple possible steady states, the kind of solution may change if 
parameters are varied: actually there can be huge qualitative changes in the outcome. 
Consequently, it is necessary to classify the outcomes of the economic analysis by their 
qualitative characteristics: are the interests of the producers to be preferred, and is the 
ecosystem to function mainly as a waste dump, or is it better for society to restrict production 
activities and enjoy the ecosystem. For this kind of analysis, bifurcation theory is an 
appropriate tool, as it provides the mathematics of qualitative change. A bifurcation analysis 
results in a bifurcation diagram, which classifies for different values of the parameters the 
qualitative features of the outcome. 
  In the following, some recent work on the economics of shallow lakes will be 
reviewed, presenting the results as much as possible in bifurcational form. The aim of this 
procedure is two-fold: first, to give an overview on a topical theme within environmental 
economics; second, to give an introduction to some recent developments in non-convex 
economics. 
 2. Shallow lake dynamics 
The ecological model that will be used in the following gives a very simplified representation 
of the complex ecological feedback mechanisms that are active in a shallow lake; essentially, 
it only captures the possible occurrence of a catastrophic shift in the state variable. The very 
stylizedness of the model is however also an advantage, as the conclusions that can be drawn 
from it will most likely be applicable to a wide range of other situations. 
2.1 Ecological processes in a shallow lake 
The following, very simplified, description of the ecological mechanisms acting in a shallow 
lake is based on the account in Scheffer's book
7, to which the reader is directed for the full 
story. 
  A shallow lake, that is a lake whose depth is up to 3 m, is characterised by two facts: 
large water plants may grow all over the lake, and in summer it is, unlike deep lakes, not 
stratified in a warm top layer and a cold bottom layer. The second fact implies that interaction 
with the sediment may be important in a shallow lake; in particular, pollutant that is 
sedimented out may be resuspended in the water column. In the simplified shallow lake 
model, this effect is however entirely ignored. 
  The lake vegetation is determined by the nutrient level. When this is low, the 
vegetation consists mostly of small water plants. But artificial fertilisers used in agriculture 
are by rainfall washed off the fields and into the lake, raising the nutrient level. The primary 
effect is to make the growth of large water plants possible. Next, the phytoplankton biomass 
(algae) increases, making the lake turbid; also, the leaves of the water plants become covered 
by a periphyton layer. Both processes lead to a decrease of the amount of light reaching the 
plants, which eventually die. 
  As the water plants disappear, the food web in the lake changes radically. A natural 
predator of phytoplankton is zooplankton, which hides between the water plants during 
daytime. They lose their natural shelter and are increasingly predated on by fishes. This 
reinforces the growth of phytoplankton and increases the turbidity of the lake further. 
Moreover, the water plants are important in keeping the lake sediment intact; in their absence, 
the sediment is more easily resuspended into the water, again increasing the turbidity of the 
lake. 
  Now, even if the nutrient loading is reduced, the water plants will not be able to 
regrow easily, as the turbidity of the lake remains high. Nutrient reduction for long periods of 
time, or removal of fishes that predate on zooplankton may be necessary to restore the lake to 
a clean state again. In some cases the turbidity of the lake is however irreversible. 
2.2 Mathematical model of a shallow lake 



















s= s(t) is the state variable of the system, that is, the concentration of phosphorus, one 
of the main nutrients, in the shallow lake. The variable
€ 
a = a(t) is the action that economic 
agents undertake: here it is the use of artificial fertilisers containing phosphorus on the fields 
surrounding the lake, which is then washed into the lake by rainfall, yielding a net inflow of nutrients. The parameter
€ 
b denotes the sedimentation rate at which phosphorus leaves the 
water column and enters the sediments at the bottom of the lake. In this very simple model, it 
is assumed that it remains in the sediment indefinitely: a more complex model would take 
into account that phosphorus from the sediments can feed back into the lake, especially if the 
vegetation of the lake has disappeared. Finally, the non-linear term models all the complex 
feedback mechanisms of the lake.  
  The curve
€ 
a = g(s) is called the response curve of the system. For large values of the 
sedimentation rate, typically for 
€ 
b ≥ 0.65, the response is monotone, as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
The figure indicates the steady state s to which the state of the lake will tend for a given 
loading level a. The most important characteristic of this response is that small changes in a 
will imply small changes in s.  
  If the sedimentation rate is lower, the non-linearities of the system change this simple 
behaviour profoundly, as is illustrated in Figure 2. 
   
Figure 2 here 
 
In this figure, two curves are shown. The thin curve, which is partly overlaid by the thick 
curve, gives all possible steady states of the system, that is, all combinations
€ 
(a,s) of actions 
and states for which the rate of change of the state is zero. This curve consists of three 
branches. The upper and the lower branch correspond to stable steady states: those are states 
such that the system tends towards them if it is already sufficiently close. The middle branch 
consists of unstable steady states, from which the system drifts away. Steady states of the 
lower and upper branch are respectively referred to as low and high pollution steady states. 
  If we imagine the system to be initially in a state where there is no loading and no 
phosphorus in the lake, the thick curve shows the response of the system to a very slow 
increase of the phosphorus loading. Increasing the loading a from an initial value 
€ 
a = 0, we 
move along the lower branch of the thick curve. Note that the phosphorus concentration s 
changes initially only very little as the loading increases. However, there is a critical point 
€ 
a = acr, a tipping point, indicated by a black dot on the horizontal axis, where the low 
pollution steady state loses stability. The system will then move rapidly along the dashed 
trajectory to a high pollution steady state.  
  If we try to restore the system to its previous low pollution state by lowering the 
loading, we move along the upper branch of the thick curve for decreasing values of a. 
 The system will remain in the high pollution state until the loading is decreased quite 
significantly below the critical loading that made the system flip into the high pollution state. 
In the reversible case, which is illustrated by Figure s, if the loading is decreased sufficiently 
much, the system encounters another tipping point
€ 
a = acr at which it flips rapidly back to the 
low pollution steady state. As increasing or decreasing the external loading leads to different 
responses, the shallow lake system is said to exhibit hysteresis; this typically occurs for 
intermediate values of the sedimentation rate, that is, for 
€ 
0.5 < b < 0.65. 
  If the sedimentation rate is still lower, that is if
€ 
0 < b ≤ 0.5, then the system response is 
irreversible; this case is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 here 
 
In these plots, the location of the middle branch of unstable steady states also provides 
information: if for fixed loading a the state s of the system is such that the point 
€ 
(a,s) lies below the middle branch, then the system is attracted to the low pollution equilibrium, 
whereas if it is above that branch, it is attracted to the high pollution equilibrium. Note that 
the middle branch decreases as loading increases, meaning that as the loading increases, the 
basin of attraction of the low pollution steady state steadily declines, whereas the basin of the 
high pollution steady state grows. If the distance of the steady state to the boundary of the 
basin of attraction is small, the steady state is said to have little resilience, as only a small 
perturbation to the steady state suffices to move the system out of that basin, and move it then 
to the other steady state. 
3. Quasi-static shallow lake economics 
Environmental pollution is an, often inescapable, side effect of agricultural or industrial 
production activities. The public has an interest in a clean environment as well as in 
something to eat: there is here a basic economic trade-off. To determine the optimal policy, 
the two interests are quantified as term of a welfare function. The analysis below is 
considered with the utopian "social planner" scenario, where there is a benevolent and 
omniscient social planner that tries to maximise social welfare. Also the possibility is 
considered that there are several of these social planners sharing access to a shallow lake, and 
that each of them is concerned by maximising the social welfare of his community. 
  First we shall be concerned with the quasi-static context, where the loading level is to 
be fixed for all time. Later, the dynamic context is considered, where the loading level is 
allowed to vary as a function of time.  
 
3.1 Quasi-static analysis 
 
To model the choice of the loading level a, we assume that there is a social planner that tries 
to maximise some social welfare stream
€ 
W(a) that depends on the loading and the amount of 
pollutant in the lake, by choosing the constant loading level a optimally. For a given choice 
of a, the system is given time to adjust to a steady state 
€ 
s= s(a), which is a solution of the 
equation 
€ 




a = g(s). 
 
Welfare is then evaluated at this steady state. Investigating the properties of these steady 
states constitutes a quasi-static analysis of the system, as neither dynamic adjustment effects 
are taken into account, nor the possibility that loading levels might change over time.  
  The social welfare stream W will be the sum of the utility UA that affectors of the state 
of the lake, for instance farmers, obtain from their use of artificial fertiliser and the disutility 
DE that enjoyers of the lake, tourists and fishermen, suffer as a result of pollution. In the 
economic shallow lake model, these utilities are modelled as
€ 




respectively; the parameter c is a measure for the economic importance of the shallow lake, 




W =UA − DE = loga−cs
2 
 
Note that these are really utilities from different groups of lake users; the planner tries to 
determine the socially optimal use of the lake. As mentioned, in this section a quasi-static 
approach is taken: the social planner is required to find the loading level a such that in a 
corresponding steady state of the shallow lake system, social welfare is optimal.   In order to do this, steady state values
€ 
s= sL(a) for low pollution steady states and 
€ 
s= sH(a) for high pollution steady states are solved from the steady state equation 
€ 
′  s (t) = 0. 
These are the functions whose graphs trace out the two stable steady state loci in Figure 2. 




WH, can be derived as functions of the loading a, yielding for
€ 
i = L or
€ 




Wi(a) =UA(a)− DE,i(a) = loga−csi(a)
2.  
 
Note that DE,L(a) and DE,H(a) indicate respectively the disutility from pollution in the low 
pollution and high pollution steady state associated to the loading level a. The social welfare 




W(a) = max WL(a),WH(a) { }.
 
 
At a maximum of W, the marginal welfare from increasing the loading should vanish, that is
€ 
′  W (a) = 0, or, equivalently, the marginal utility of the affectors should equal the marginal 




′  U  A(a) = ′  D  E,i(a). 
 






= 2csi(a) ′  s  i(a).   
 
The value of 
€ 
′  s  i(a) is obtained by differentiating the steady state equation
€ 
a = g(si(a)) with 
respect to a. Solving for 
€ 




′  s  i(a) =
1
′  g (si(a))
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′  g (si(a))
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Alternatively, this condition can be obtained by using a Lagrange function approach, where 
the social planner maximises welfare W subject to the condition that 
€ 
a− g(s) = 0. One major 
advantage of this approach is that no distinction has to be made between separate solution 
branches of the equilibrium equation
€ 






2 + p a− g(s) ( ). 
 
Note the appearance of a new variable p, which will turn out to be the shadow value of the 
lake; that is the price the social planner is willing to pay for adding another unit of pollutant. As the planner is never willing to pay for more pollution, the shadow value is going to be 
negative.  
  If the loading-state pair
€ 
a,s ( ) maximises social welfare W subject to the condition 
€ 
a− g(s) = 0 that the lake is in dynamic equilibrium, then the triple 
€ 
a,s,p ( ) satisfies 

















= 2cs+ p ′  g (s).
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obtained previously. Besides reconfirming the result, we have also found an interpretation of 
the Lagrange conditions: the first,
€ 
∂L/∂a = 0, is the economic equilibrium condition for the 
loading: the marginal increase in benefits from polluting the lake should equal the marginal 
shadow cost of that pollution. The second, 
€ 
∂L/∂p = 0, is the dynamic equilibrium of the lake, 
and the third condition 
€ 
∂L/∂s= 0 is the economic equilibrium equation for the pollutant in 
the lake: the marginal welfare cost of increasing the amount of pollutant should equal its 
marginal benefits.  
 
Figure 4 here 
 
  We show these marginal utilities in Figure 4 as functions of the loading level a.  
The marginal utility for using artificial fertiliser, indicated by the dashed graph, decreases 
with an increase of the use of fertilisers: this is the usual law of diminishing returns.  
The marginal disutilities in the low and high-pollution states respectively are indicated by 
solid graphs in the figure. The effect of increasing the input level of fertiliser on the disutility 
generated in the low pollution steady state also follows a standard pattern: the marginal 
disutility in the low pollution equilibrium increases with the input level. Note that it has a 
vertical asymptote at the upward tipping point: this is a consequence of the fact that already a 
little below the tipping point, small changes in the input level induce large changes in the 
pollution level of the lake. It is this feature of tipping points on which the rising variance 
early warning systems for ecological transitions are based
8,9.  
  The effect of the pollution input level on the high pollution steady state is at first sight 
a little surprising, as the marginal disutility from pollution in that state decreases instead of 
increases with increasing input levels. Partly this can be understood as before: slightly above 
the downward tipping point, small increases of loading imply large increases in the 
phosphorus concentration of the lake, and this response diminishes as the loading increases 
further.   Turning to the determination of the (local) maxima of the welfare function, note that 
these occur at those intersection points of the graphs of marginal utility and marginal 
disutility where marginal utility from increasing the loading is initially larger than marginal 
disutility; the other intersection points correspond to local minima. In Figure 4 we have two 
such intersection points, at
€ 
a ≈ 0.047 (high pollution branch) and
€ 
a ≈ 0.072 (low pollution 
branch) respectively. In this case, it is immediately obvious that the latter intersection 
corresponds to a global maximum of the welfare function, as pollution is lower and at the 
same time the use of fertiliser is higher compared to the first intersection point. This is borne 
out by the graph of the welfare function 
€ 
W(a), which is given in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 here 
 
In this figure, total welfare is drawn as a solid graph, and the welfare in the high pollution 
branch is indicated by a dashed graph. Notice that at the tipping point, welfare drops instantly 
by a large amount: of course, this is what we mean by an environmental catastrophe. What is 
interesting though is that the welfare maximising loading level is very close to the tipping 
point. This is fairly typical for maximising behaviour, to strain a system towards the 
"maximal sustainable yield". The danger of this approach is that if the model of the decision 
maker is not quite correct, or if the state of the system is subjected to small random shocks 
that are neglected in the modelling stage, the real system may easily cross the tipping point 
and flip to the high-pollution, low-welfare state. 
  Other situations are possible as well; one of them is illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 here 
 
Here again we see three points of equilibrium of marginal utility and disutility, two of which 
correspond to local maxima of the welfare function. Examination of the total welfare function 
shows, for increasing a, first the familiar pattern of welfare taking a local maximum very 
close to the tipping point. But then the welfare function rises again, until it reaches, for a 
much higher loading level, its global maximum. In this case, it turns out, the economic 
service the lake provides as a waste dump of phosphorus outweighs the economic importance 
of the ecological services. 
 
Figure 7 here 
 
  The situation is different again if the lake is irreversible; this is illustrated in Figure 7. 
Note that the welfare function looks much like that of the reversible case of Figure 5. There is 
one important difference though: if the loading a is allowed to increase above the critical 
value, the lake flips, and the welfare level drops catastrophically. What is more, it cannot be 
restored to its former value: the welfare loss is irrevocable. 
  We find that we can classify the different situations, described by different values of 
the parameters b and c, by determining whether the high pollution or the low pollution 
furnishes a global maximum of the social welfare function. The result of this classification is 
shown in Figure 8. 
  
Figure 8 here 
 
There are several regions in the plot shown in Figure 8. The region to the right of the dashed 
curve is the region where the social welfare function has a single local maximum, which is at 
the same time a global maximum. To the right of the dashed curve, the social welfare function has two separate local maxima. The region where this is the case is divided into 
three subregions: the high pollution region, the low pollution region, and the region labelled 
"dependent on initial state". The significance of the first two is clear: if the pair
€ 
(b,c) takes a 
value in the low pollution region, the low pollution equilibrium furnishes the global 
maximum of the social welfare function; the analogous result holds for the high pollution 
region. Moreover, the social planner can always reach the global maximum by adjusting the 
loading a appropriately. 
  Matters are different in the third region: for parameter values in this region, the low 
pollution equilibrium furnishes the global maximum of the social welfare function, but this 
maximum cannot be reached if the lake is allowed to pass beyond the tipping point, as it 
cannot then be restored to a low pollution state. This is the region where wrong decisions, or 
mere inattention of decision makers, can lead to an ecological catastrophe that has far-
reaching welfare effects.  
 
3.2 The quasi-static shallow lake game 
The fate of shallow lakes, and natural resources in general, are often the outcome of a game 
that several policy makers are playing: a lake might be bordered on by several communes or 
several countries. The lake services are often best modelled as a public good, and as such 
they are subjected to the tragedy of the commons. The pollutant in the game is a stock 
variable, generating costs for all lake users, whereas the individual loadings are flow 
variables, generating individual benefits. If the lake users do not cooperate, they have a 
tendency to emphasise their personal benefits over the commonly shared costs: the short-time 
flow effects tend to dominate the long-time stock effects.  
  The quasi-static shallow lake game, which will be discussed now, is briefly mentioned 
by Mäler et al
1. Let us examine the situation more closely. Assume that there are n agents; 









E = logai −cis
2. 
 
Here ai is the loading level of agent i, and ci is his cost parameter. The total loading is now 
the sum of the individual loadings; we therefore obtain the following equation for the steady 
state of the lake: 
 
    
€ 




g(s) = bs− s
2 /(s
2 +1). The agents play a game: that is, each agent tries to 
maximise his individual payoff 
€ 
W
i by choosing his loading level ai appropriately. 
  As an aside, it should be mentioned that this setup is almost equivalent to a standard 
public goods game; the author is indebted to P. Heijnen for this observation. The equivalence 
is effected by solving  
€ 
s= s(a1 ++ an), where 
€ 
s(a) = sL(a) or
€ 
s(a) = sH(a), from the steady 
state equation. Introducing the equivalent payoff function
€ 




leads then to considering 
 
    
€ 




ai = f (a1 ++ an)ai.    
 
The main difference with the standard case is that the function s, and consequently the 
function f, can be multi-valued.     We consider non-cooperative play, and we look for Nash equilibria of this game: that 

















n of the other agents, agent i cannot do better than to choose action a
*
i 
himself. Assuming the actions of the other players known - we drop the stars - agent i 
determines his own action by solving the constrained optimisation problem to maximise his 
welfare, given the steady state equation.  
  As above, it is convenient to formulate the maximisation problem of the agent as a 
problem with an equality restriction; that is, the dependence of the state on the action
€ 
s= s(a) 
is not solved from the equilibrium equation
€ 
a = g(s), but this equation is kept in the 




Li = logai −cis
2 + pi a j ∑ − g(s) ( ); 
 
here pi is the shadow cost which agent i assigns to the state of the lake, that is, the marginal 
cost associated to a unit increase of the amount of pollutant in the lake. The action of the 






= pi, pi ′  g (s) = 2cis, a j j=1
n ∑ = g(s). 








′  g (s)
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We recognise the economic equilibrium equation; but here we have this equation for every
  
€ 
i =1,…,n. To obtain the Nash equilibria steady states, these n equations have to be combined 
with the steady state equation 
 





∑ − g(s) = 0. 
 



























The point of these equations is that the coefficient cNC is the only quantity that depends on the 
number and the type of the players. There are two important special cases: if there is only one 
player, then
€ 
cNC = c. In the symmetric case of n identical players, that is, if  
€ 
c1 == cn = c, we 
find that 
€ 
cNC = c/n.    To illustrate what effects of adding a player has on the Nash equilibrium pollution 
levels of the lake, the symmetric case is considered, for which   
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′  g (s)
,  
 
where k =L,H, are given in Figure 9 as functions, not of the actions a, but of the state s. 
  
Figure 9 here 
 
The marginal disutility for low pollution states vanishes at 
€ 
s= 0, and it has an asymptote at 
the first tipping point, where
€ 
′  g (s) = 0. Therefore, its graph always crosses the graph of the 
marginal utility in the low pollution region. We can conclude that there is always a low 
pollution candidate location for a Nash equilibrium for the quasi-static game. Moreover, we 
can readily conjecture from the figure that the low pollution Nash equilibria will be located 
closer and closer to the tipping point as the number of players increases. 
  In the figure, we see that there are two crossings of the graphs of marginal utility 
and marginal disutility in the high pollution region. As before, the lower of the two 
corresponds to a local minimum of the welfare function of the players, and hence has no 
economic significances. The other crossing determines the location of a high pollution 
candidate Nash equilibrium. We see that the corresponding state of the system increases as 
the number of players increases. 
  However, to conclude that the crossings determine the location of true Nash 
equilibria values of the state would be premature. It still has to be checked whether, given 
that the actions of the other players correspond to the value determined by the crossing, the 
candidate value for the action does indeed maximise utility for a given agent. The difficulty is 
exactly the same as the distinction between local and global maxima in the simpler social 
planner problem discussed above. It turns out that the difficulty is not always hypothetical: 
there are parameter sets where either the low pollution or the high pollution candidate 
equilibrium does not furnish a maximum of the individual payoff. In such a situation, a player 
obtains a higher payoff by deviating from the symmetric candidate strategy, and the crossing 
does not furnish a Nash equilibrium. If the lake is irreversible, there is the additional 
complication that some states of the lake cannot be reached, depending on the initial state of 
the lake. 
 
Figure 10 here 
 
  As noted, the principal property of the solution is that the high pollution loading 
increases significantly if there are more and more players. This deterioration of the outcome 
reflects a fundamental distinction between the pollutant s in the lake, which is a common 
stock variable, and the phosphorus loadings ai, which are individual flow variables. If the 
number of players increases, the relative effect of individual actions on the state variable 
decreases. Moreover, conservative behaviour as restricting the phosphorus loading is not rewarded, as other agents can freeride on this by increasing their loading. This is an example 
of the tragedy of the commons. 
  However, in the low pollution region, the tragedy is initially mitigated by the fact 
that at the tipping point, the marginal disutility of adding pollutant is infinite: more and more 
players do push the low pollution candidate location closer and closer to the brink, but not 
over it. Of course, if there are sufficiently many players, the low pollution location will not 
furnish a welfare maximum, given the actions of the other players and players will deviate to 
the high pollution outcome. 
  The situation should be contrasted with the welfare gains that can be obtained if all 










Again by solving the constrained optimisation problem, we find that the state has to satisfy a 


















Note that in the symmetric case cC=c, and that the outcome is independent of the number of 
players: the eventual steady state reached is the same each player would reach if he would 
have been a single social planner. 
3.3 The repeated game 
Brock and de Zeeuw extended the quasi-static analysis of the shallow lake game by 
considering an infinitely repeated game
10. They focussed on the question whether the 
cooperative solution of the quasi-static game can be supported by a trigger strategy of the 
players.  
  The idea is the following: at the beginning of the repeated game, all players state their 
intention to follow a cooperative strategy, which will lead to a high level of welfare. 
However, this situation is not stable in the sense that if all players but one follow the 
cooperative strategy, whereas if one player deviates from it by choosing his action non-
cooperatively the payoff of the deviating player will typically be higher than that which he 
would have obtained if had followed the cooperative action. By symmetry, all players have 
therefore an incentive to deviate from the cooperative strategy, and they will in the end all 
play non-cooperative strategies. The social welfare in this case will be lower than in the 
cooperative case. 
  To stabilise the cooperative solution, players can announce to play a trigger strategy, 
announcing that they will play the cooperative strategy unless one player deviates. After that 
event, the player playing the trigger strategy will play the Nash equilibrium strategy with the 
lowest payoff. An agent will have an incentive to deviate if he does not care greatly for future 
welfare benefits. To evaluate the trigger strategy, we have to know the time preferences of 
the agents; these are expressed by a discount factor δ at which a contribution W to the social welfare tomorrow is equally welcome as a contribution δ W today. It is obvious that if the 
discount factor is equal to 0, that is, if agents do not care about the future at all, a trigger 
strategy will have no bite, and every agent will deviate. At the other end of the spectrum, if 
the discount factor is 1, welfare benefits in the distant future weigh as heavily as present 
benefits, and deviations will never be optimal. The effectiveness of the trigger strategy can 
therefore be expressed quantitavely by the minimal discount factor δmin for which no player 
has an incentive to deviate. Let Wd denote the welfare gain in the one-shot game for a player 
that deviates, while the other players cooperate, let WNash denote the welfare gain in the Nash 
equilibrium and let Wc denote the welfare gain under cooperation. Brock and de Zeeuw give 
the relation 








The dependence of the minimal discount factor δmin on the parameter b and the number of 
players n is illustrated in Figure 11. 
    
Figure 11 here 
 
In the figure, contour lines of constant values of δmin are shown. They are computed for a 
continuum of values of n; obviously, only the integer values of n are significant. Note the 
thick and rather wriggly curve, running from (b,n)=(0.5,2.7) upwards. At this curve, the 
value of δmin is discontinuous: for instance, for b=0.6, it changes from approximately 0.67 
before the discontinuity to 0.03 after it. This reflects the fact, already noted in the previous 
subsection, that increasing the number of players n has the roughly same effect as decreasing 
the economic weight c of the lake. In this case, at the discontinuity ridge, a high pollution 
Nash equilibrium springs into existence, and the strength of the threat, to switch to the Nash 
equilibrium with the lowest pay-off, is suddenly much enhanced. 
  Of course, it is debatable whether a player that wishes to punish a deviation from 
cooperative behaviour will actually execute a Nash equilibrium strategy with minimal pay-
off, as the cost to himself are substantial. Therefore, we should contrast the situation of 
Figure 11 to the situation that after a deviation again Nash strategies will be played, but now 
those with the highest pay-off. The corresponding values of δmin are given in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12 here 
 
The discontinuity ridge of Figure 11 has disappeared; a different ridge appears, but for much 
larger values of b and n. We conclude that as the threat loses its "bite", the trigger strategy is 
less effective in stabilising cooperative behaviour. Still, the values of δmin are still moderate: a 
value of δmin=0.7 corresponds to an effective time horizon of about 7 periods. 
4. Dynamic shallow lake economics  
In the quasi-static context, which we considered in the previous section, there is for a large 
range of parameters a low pollution steady state, or in the game context, a low pollution Nash 
equilibrium; this is largely due to the fact that in this context, agents and players are 
committed to strategies which cannot change in time. Therefore, the sharp increase in 
marginal disutility at the tipping point keeps the solutions in the low pollution region.   These results, rather positive from an environmental point of view, are weakened if a 
full dynamic context is considered, as we shall do in the present section. First we consider a 
single social planner that allows the amount of phosphorus loaded into the lake to change as a 
function of time: a=a(t). The amount s=s(t) of phosphorus in the lake still evolves according 











Social welfare W is now taken to depend on the total welfare stream w(t) = log(a(t)) - c s(t)
2 











∞ ∫ . 
 
That is, we consider the case that future contributions to the welfare stream are discounted at 
a discount rate ρ. To solve this optimisation problem, we form the current value Pontryagin 





2 + p a− g(s) ( ). 
 
Note the similarity to the Lagrange function: in fact, the only difference is that the state 
s=s(t), the loading a=a(t), and the shadow value p(t) of the lake are all three functions of 
time. Pontryagin's maximum principle now states that a solution (a(t), s(t), p(t)) of the 
problem to maximise W, taking into account the evolution law of the pollutant in the lake, 















′  p = ρp−
∂P
∂s
= 2cs+ ρ + ′  g (s) ( )p.
 
Again, the formal similarities to the Lagrange conditions should be noted. After elimination 
of a, we retain a system of two differential equations. In order to obtain a solution to the 
system, we need to specify two additional conditions. A natural condition is putting 
€ 
s(0) = s0, 
where 
€ 
s0 is the initial state of the lake. The second condition, the so-called transversality 
condition, is more involved; it states that the discounted shadow value of the lake at the end 





−ρtp(t) = 0. 
 
In practice, solving a problem of this type boils down to first finding steady states
€ 
(s  ,p  )of the 
system of differential equations, for if 
€ 
p(t) = p  is constant for all t, then the transversality 
condition is surely satisfied. The second step is then to determine solution trajectories of the 
system that tend in the limit 
€ 
t →∞ to the given steady state. This procedure is iterated for all 
steady states.    In the shallow lake dynamic optimisation problem, there are either one ore two steady 
states that can be limits to solution trajectories. If two such states exist, there may be initial 
states
€ 
s0 for which there are several candidate solution trajectories starting at
€ 
s0. The trajectory 
with the highest value of the welfare then furnishes a solution to the maximisation 
problem
1,11. A particular feature of the shallow lake problem is that there may be a single 
initial state
€ 
s* at which two candidate solution trajectories start that generate the same welfare, 
and which both yield a true solution to the problem. Such an initial state is an indifference 
state, as the planner is indifferent between two qualitatively different loading schedules. 
[Footnote 1 here] 
  Solution trajectories are traditionally shown in an
€ 
(s,a)-diagram instead of an
€ 
(s,p)-
diagram; the transformation is performed by making use of the relation 
€ 
a = −1/p. A typical 
solution of the shallow lake problem is given in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13 here. 
 
The values of b, c and ρ are respectively 0.55, 0.5 and 0.03. The steady states are indicated by 
dots; they are located at approximately 
€ 
(s  ,a ) = (0.35,0.08) and
€ 
(s  , a ) = (1.76,0.21). The curves 
through these steady states are the solution curves of the system of differential equations that 
tend to these states in the limit
€ 
t →∞.  
  Note that if 
€ 
0.58 ≤ s0 ≤1.21, there are several possible choices for the initial loading 
level 
€ 
a0 and the associated shadow value
€ 
p0. The initial values that maximise welfare are 
those points that are located on the thickly drawn curves. There is a single point
€ 
s* = 0.83 for 
which two different pairs of initial values 
€ 
(s0,a0) lead to solution trajectories that optimise 
social welfare: one is associated with initially very little, though gradually increasing, 
loading, tending to the low pollution steady state; the other is characterised by overall high 
loading, and that solution tends to a high pollution steady state. 
  The result of the optimisation analysis can be given as a loading policy
€ 
a = a(s), 
combined with the implied steady states and their basin of attractions - that is, the set of 
initial states which will be steered by the optimal loading policy to a given steady state. For 
the situation of Figure 13, these data are given in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14 here. 
 
  In the next subsections, we shall discuss how these solutions depend on the problem 
parameters. 
    
4.1 In the footsteps of Ramsey 
Ramsey famously asserted in his 1928 article about optimal savings that to take any other 
discount rate than 
€ 
ρ = 0 is "ethically indefensible". In the present context, he probably would 










should be maximised. There is an interpretation problem here, though: in most cases, the 
value of the integral is either plus or minus infinity, and there is then no good way to compare 
the values. There are sophisticated mathematical concepts for dealing with this problem (overtaking optimality, catching-up optimality), but for the purpose of this paper, it is 










T ∫ . 
 
This quantity is usually finite; moreover, it is clear that if loading a(t) and pollutant s(t) tends 
to constant levels 
€ 
a  and 
€ 




w = loga −cs 
2. 
 
Looking at the three conditions obtained from the Pontryagin maximum principle, we see that 
the steady states 
€ 







+ p  , 0 = a − g(s  ), 0 = 2cs + p  ′  g (s  ). 
 
These conditions are identical to those we have obtained in the quasi-static case. As the 
welfare flow here is also equal to the welfare function in that case, we conclude that the 
Ramsey and the quasi-static context are equivalent. In particular, Figure 8 summarises the 
qualitative properties of the optimal solution depending on the parameters; but in the Ramsey 
context, this figure gives information about the solution structure of a dynamic problem, 
which moreover can be expected to be the limiting case of the problem with positive 
discounting. 
4.2 Positive discounting   
Policy practice has not followed Ramsey's categorical imperative: in almost all policy 
decisions, the wishes of the present generation are allowed to weigh more heavily than the 
projected interests of future generations.  
  The value of ecosystem services are to a large extent a given of a particular situation. 
For instance, Hein et al. analysed the values of the ecosystem services of De Wieden 
wetlands in the Netherlands
12, and Hein provided an estimate of the cost of removing 
pollutant from those wetlands
13.  
  A policy maker that has to determine an optimal pollutant loading schedule has to 
accord some kind of weight to the future damages arising from pollution, and this is often a 
matter of choice. In the Netherlands, there used to be a standard future discount rate of 7% 
per annum; recently, this has been changed to 2.5% + x%, where x is to be determined 
according to the special requirements of the valuation at hand. 
  Wagener
11 and Kiseleva and Wagener
14 obtained a classification, analogous to that of 
Figure 8 of the quasi-static and the Ramsey case, for the fully dynamic case where the 
discount rate
€ 
ρ > 0. The analysis is based on bifurcation theory, as optimal loading policies 
can be classified according to qualitative characteristics. In the discounted shallow lake 
problem, there are only three types, given in Figure 15. 
  
Figure 15 here. 
 
A loading policy gives rise to either one ore two long term attracting steady states; in the first 
eventuality, and if the sedimentation rate b is not too large, the steady state can be typified as being either low pollution or high pollution: however, the latter classification is not 
qualitative but quantitative. 
  If there are two attracting steady states, the policy function is either continuous, or it 
has a jump. If it is continuous, in between the two attracting steady states, there is also a 
repelling steady state. For initial states close to such a repeller, the optimal loading policy is 
to keep the loading at the repeller's level for a long time, before steering the lake either to a 
low or a high pollution equilibrium. Below we shall see that this situation typically occurs if 
the discount rate is large. The result can be formulated as follows: if  the social planner is 
mainly concerned with the short run, there is a critical region of initial states of the lake at 
which the optimal policy of the planner is to defer the decision between an industry-friendly 
or an environmentally-friendly policy to a later date. 
  The situation is quite different if the optimal policy function has a jump; this 
commonly occurs if the discount rate is low, and if the planner is consequently mainly 
concerned with the short run. In that constellation, the planner wants the lake to leave the 
critical region around the jump point as quickly as possible, and he makes his choice between 
the two types of policy right away. 
  The dependence of the different possibilities on the parameters b and c are given in 
Figure 16; this figure should be compared to Figure 8. 
 
Figure 16 here. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this review, outcomes of the shallow lake long-term interest conflict in a number of 
different settings have been presented, in particular in the context of quasi-static and dynamic 
social planning, of quasi-static non-cooperative play, and of the effect of trigger strategies in 
repeated quasi-static play. A characteristic feature of this interest conflicts, and of pollution 
problems in general, is the qualitative dichotomy in possible outcomes: the lake (or the 
ecosystem, or the climate) ends up in either a clean or in a polluted state, both of which, if 
attained, is stabilised by some kind of feedback mechanism. The social choice therefore 
always incorporates a qualitative aspect: the decision maker has to decide for or against 
production, for or against conserving the ecosystem.  
  This qualitative distinction between the possible socially optimal outcomes enables us 
to present the outcome of the analyses in the form of a bifurcation diagram (Figures 8, 10 and 
16), which gives a graphical overview of the qualitative characteristics of the solutions, 
depending on the parameters of the problem. In the case of the repeated game, the outcome 
was a parameter diagram featuring a catastrophic set, where the economic quantity of interest 
changes discontinuously. The most critical region in these bifurcation diagrams is the "history 
dependent" region: in these cases, neglect by an actual decision maker that allows the 
ecosystem to flip can lead to large irrecoverable welfare losses. 
  It is readily apparent that this line of research, even in the case of the shallow lake 
problem, is far from being completed: for instance, the dynamic open loop
1 and closed 
loop
15,16 games have still to be analysed in a similar fashion. It can be readily conjectured that 
the classification of dynamic Nash equilibria for small values of the discount factor
€ 
ρ should 
resemble Figure 10, much as Figure 16 resembles Figure 8. Also the situation of asymmetric 
players is still to be investigated, as well as that of a shallow lake subject to stochastic 
dynamics
17. Another interesting development away from the social planner context is the 
analysis of the political economy of the decision making
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Shallow lake dynamics, monotone case (
€ 
b = 0.68). 
The curve indicates the locus of the steady states
€ 
(a,s) of the shallow lake dynamics; all 











Shallow lake dynamics, reversible case (
€ 
b = 0.52): effect of changing the loading slowly.  
As in Figure 1, the thinly drawn curve, mostly overlaid by the thick curve, indicates the locus 
of the steady states
€ 
(a,s) of the shallow lake dynamics; the dashed part of the curve 
corresponds to unstable equilibria. The thick curve shows the response of the state of the lake 
to slow changes of the loading. If the loading starts at 
€ 
a = 0 and is increased, at first the 
amount of pollutant in the lake increases proportionally; but at 
€ 
a =acr it flips catastrophically 
to a much higher value of s, associated with a turbid lake. If then the loading is decreased 
again, the lake does not instantly jump back to a clean state; only if a is reduced to the lower 
value 
€ 
a = acr, the lake flips back again to a low value of s, associated with a clean lake. 










Shallow lake dynamics, irreversible case (
€ 
b = 0.49): effect of changing the loading slowly.  
Legend as in Figure 2. In the irreversible case, if the lake is in a high-pollution state, which 
corresponds in the figure to the upper branch of the thick curve, even by a reduction of the 
loading to the minimum value
€ 













b = 0.52, c =1.3). 
At an economic equilibrium, the marginal utility
€ 
′  U  A(a) to the affectors from adding another 
unit of loading, indicated by the dashed graph, equals the marginal disutility
€ 
′  D  E,i(a) of the 
enjoyers, solid graphs, where 
€ 
i = L or 
€ 
i = H according to whether the lake is in the low or in 
the high pollution regime. Note that the disutility in the low pollution regime increases 
sharply as
€ 
a approaches the critical value, forcing at least one solution of the economic 
equilibrium equation to be on the low pollution branch. The two intersections marked with a 
dot correspond to local maxima of the welfare function. 


















(b = 0.52, c =1.3). 




WH(a) (dashed), as well as the function 
€ 
W(a) = max WL(a),WH(a) { } (solid). Welfare drops significantly as the loading
€ 
a is increased 
past the tipping point value. Note also how the maximal value of welfare is obtained for a 
loading level that is very close to the critical level. 










Marginal utilities and welfare 
€ 
(b = 0.63, c = 0.35) 
Legend as in Figures 4 and 5. Again, there is a huge drop in welfare at the tipping point; 
however, as the economic importance
€ 
c of the ecosystem to the social planner is very low, 






















Marginal utilities and welfare 
€ 
(b = 0.49, c = 0.8) 
Legend as in Figures 4 and 5. The value of 
€ 
b is such that the lake is irreversible; if the lake is 
initially clean, but the loading is allowed to grow past the critical value, the ensuing welfare 






















Effect of welfare optimisation on the lake. 
If the pair
€ 
(b,c) corresponds to a point to the right of the dashed curve, the welfare function is 
maximal at a unique loading level, which moreover can always be reached. To the left of the 
dashed curve, there are two candidate maximisers. In the 'high pollution' region, maximal 
welfare is obtained in a high loading, high pollution state of the lake; in the 'low pollution' 
region, welfare is maximised in a low loading, low pollution state. For pairs
€ 
(b,c) in the third 
region, the decision maker has to take care not to let the loading increase past the critical 

















The effect of adding a player
€ 
(b = 0.52,c =1) 
Marginal utility (dashed curve) and disutility (drawn curve) of increasing the loading, 
expressed as a function of the state s, for the case of one and two countries bordering the lake. 
There are in both cases three intersections of the two curves; only the leftmost (clean) and the 
rightmost (polluted) intersection are potential Nash equilibria. The location of the clean 
intersection hardly changes as the number of player increases, since the marginal disutility 
rises sharply shortly before the flipping point. In contrast to this, the location of the polluted 















marginal welfareFigure 10 
 
Classification of Nash equilibria configurations
€ 
(n = 2). 
For the two-player quasi-static shallow lake game, this diagram summarises the possible 
outcomes. To the right of the dashed curve, there is only a single candidate Nash equilibrium, 
which also furnishes a true Nash equilibrium. To the left of the curve, there are always two 
candidates. In the region 'clean NE' and 'polluted NE', respectively the polluted and the clean 
candidate equilibria fail to be Nash. In the region '#NE=2', both candidates are Nash; 
however, the value of the payoff is always higher in the clean Nash equilibrium. In the region 
'#NE=1 or 2', also both candidates are Nash equilibria; however, if the initial pollution is too 
high, then the clean Nash equilibrium cannot be reached. Also in this region, the payoff in the 
clean Nash equilibrium is higher than in the polluted one. Finally, in the part of the region 
'polluted NE' above the dotted line, the payoff in the clean candidate Nash equilibrium, which 
fails to be truly Nash, is higher than in the polluted Nash equilibrium: in this region, the 
prisoners dilemma mechanism is at work.  
polluted NE
clean NE
 NE   2
Wclean Wpoll













Contours of minimal discount factor for 'worst Nash' trigger 
€ 
(c = 2). 
The plot illustrates the minimal discount factor
€ 
δmin for which a trigger strategy, threatening 
to switch to the most polluted Nash equilibrium, still stabilises the cooperative outcome. Its 
dependence is shown on the sedimentation rate b, as well as the number of players n, treated 
as if the number of players were a continuous variable; only integer values of n have any real 
meaning. The minimal discount factor is discontinuous along the ridge which runs from
€ 
(b,n) ≈ (0.5,2.7) to
€ 
(b,n) ≈ (0.8,4). The ridge is associated with the appearance of a low 
payoff polluted Nash equilibrium. Note that the threat works well for large values of n, that 
is, 
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Contours of minimal discount factor for 'highest payoff Nash' trigger 
€ 
(c = 2). 
Legend as in Figure 11, only that the threat is to change to the Nash strategy with the highest 
payoff. Note that the discontinuity ridge of Figure 11 disappears, but that there appears a 
different discontinuity ridge, now associated with the disappearance of a high payoff clean 

















Typical solution of the dynamic shallow lake problem
€ 
(b = 0.55,c = 0.5,ρ = 0.03). 
Two solution trajectories are shown (thin curves) that originate from the focus in the middle 
of the plot and that tend either to the left or the right steady state. The thick curves indicate 
the parts of the trajectories maximising welfare. At
€ 
s ≈ 0.85 there is an indifference state, at 
which the decision maker is indifferent between the low loading, low pollution solution 
leading to the left, and the high loading, high pollution solution leading to the right. 










Policy function and optimal dynamics
€ 
(b = 0.55,c = 0.5,ρ = 0.03). 
Retaining only the relevant parts of the solution trajectories shown in Figure 13 gives the 
optimal policy function
€ 
a = a(s); note the discontinuity at the indifference point. On the 
horizontal axis, the resulting dynamics are given. The indifference point is marked by the 









Three classes of optimal policy functions 
Top left: two attracting steady states, separated by an indifference point. Top right: two 
attracting steady states, separated by a repeller. Bottom: a single steady state. The distinction 
on the bottom line between a clean steady state (left) and a polluted one (right) is not 














Effect of dynamic welfare optimisation on the lake (top) and detail (bottom) for
€ 
ρ = 0.03. 
If the pair
€ 
(b,c) corresponds to a point to the right and below of the drawn curves, there is 
only a single attracting steady state and the optimal policy function is continuous. For high 
values of c, the steady state corresponds to a clean lake, for low values of c, it corresponds to 
a polluted lake. In the region on the left, which is enclosed by the two drawn curves, there are 
two attracting steady states, separated by an indifference point. Moreover, in the detailed 
figure, close to the point C, there is a region where there are two attracting steady states, 
separated by a repeller, and where the optimal policy function is continuous.   
 




































Other names for indifference points are "Skiba points", "Dechert-Nishismura-Skiba points" or 
"Dechert-Nishimura-Skiba-Sethi points" in the economic literature, and "shock points" in the 
optimal control literature. 
 